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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of changes in job security on corporate innovation in 20 non-U.S. OECD 
countries. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we provide firm-level evidence that the enhancement of 
labor protection has a negative impact on innovation. We then discuss possible channels and find that 
employee-friendly labor reforms induce inventor shirking and a distortion in labor flow. Further investigation 
reveals that the negative relation is more pronounced in (1) firms that heavily rely on external financing, (2) 
firms that have high R&D intensity, (3) manufacturing industries, and (4) civil-law countries. Our micro-level 
evidence indicates that enhanced employment protection impedes corporate innovation. 
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Employment protection laws, Labor law reform, Corporate innovation, Inventor turnover 
1. Introduction 
Innovation is the engine of a country's long-run economic growth (e.g., Solow, 1957, Romer, 1986, Romer, 
1990). At the firm level, Griliches (1981) and Hall (1993) show that high-patent firms are associated with 
significantly higher stock market valuation. At the aggregate level, Hsu (2009) shows that the growth in patents 
predicts future stock market returns and premiums. It is therefore vitally important, especially for policy makers, 
to understand the underlying factors that drive innovation and ascertain their impact. Recent studies show that 
labor protection is an important factor affecting firm innovation. Nevertheless, the evidence is mixed and far 
from conclusive. For example, Acharya et al. (2013) explore the impact of dismissal laws on innovation in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany and conclude that stringent dismissal laws spur 
innovation. Acharya et al. (2014) find that wrongful discharge laws in the United States that 
protect employees against unjust dismissal promote innovation. In contrast, Bozkaya and Kerr (2014) find that in 
European countries, stringent employment protection regulations hinder venture capital investment, which is 
critical in nurturing innovation in entrepreneurial firms. Using U.S. data, Bradley et al. (2016) find that labor 
unions, which provide employees with perhaps the strongest form of protection against termination, impede 
corporate innovation. Moreover, both the European Union and the OECD have prioritized “strengthening 
innovation” on their agenda and have urged member countries to support entrepreneurial and innovative 
activities.1 In this paper, motivated by the ongoing debate and policy implications, we aim to gain a richer 
understanding of this important issue by examining the relationship between innovation and employment 
protection laws in 20 OECD countries. 
Given the conflicting evidence in the literature, we revisit this issue with two competing hypotheses. Our first 
hypothesis argues that strong labor protection promotes innovation. There are at least two plausible reasons for 
such a relationship. First, employment protection laws protect employees against arbitrary dismissal and restrict 
the terms on which companies can hire workers, thereby providing employees with job 
security. Manso (2011) argues that the innovation-motivating incentive scheme should include both tolerance 
for early failure and reward for long-term success, suggesting that job security is an important factor in fostering 
innovation. Second, the theory on property rights (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990) 
suggests that holdup problems can arise in bilateral relationships when contracts are incomplete. For instance, 
firm managers could expropriate the payoffs by laying off the employee after a successful innovation. The 
likelihood of such ex-post holdup problems, in turn, inhibits the employee's ex ante willingness and effort to 
innovate. Employment protection laws constrain the firm's ability to arbitrarily discharge an employee, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of holdup problems and incentivizing employees to innovate. Thus, stringent labor 
protection helps to promote firm innovation. 
An alternative hypothesis predicts that labor protection impedes innovation. There are at least four plausible 
reasons for such a relationship. First, Allard (2005) points out that employment stability resulting from labor 
protection may lead to employee immobility because labor protection places a limit on the entry of 
new talents, skills, and ideas into a firm. Similarly, Autor et al. (2007) find that employers are more cautious in 
hiring new employees and laying off current employees once wrongful discharge laws are adopted. The 
distorted job flow implies that employers are reluctant to terminate unproductive employees due to high 
dismissal costs, thereby lowering labor productivity.2 Second, because strong labor protection lowers the 
probability of dismissal, it could encourage shirking, resulting in lower levels of innovation effort and 
output. Bradley et al. (2016) find that labor unions that prevent employees from punishment for shirking impede 
firm innovation. Third, the strictness of employment protection is negatively related to wage inequality among 
workers (e.g., Koeniger et al., 2007). The reduced wage gap could alter the landscape of the labor market by 
forcing out skilled workers, leading to a decline in innovation in countries with stringent labor protection. Last, 
strict labor regulations may hinder venture capital investment, which is the lifeblood of innovation 
(e.g., Chemmanur et al., 2014). Bozkaya and Kerr (2014) find that stricter employment regulations cause higher 
labor adjustment costs than other labor market insurance mechanisms and venture capital investors are 
especially sensitive to these costs. Thus, stringent labor protection impedes firm innovation. 
In this study, we examine whether and to what extent labor protection affects innovation at the firm level. To 
measure the stringency of employment protection in a country, we create an indicator variable (EPL_C) that 
captures large changes in the employment protection legislation (EPL) index (see Allard, 2005). The EPL index 
captures intertemporal variations in employment protection across 21 OECD countries from 1950 to 2003. To 
develop proxies for innovation, we use a data set obtained from the European patent office. We measure a 
firm's innovation quantity by counting the number of patents applied for and its innovation quality by summing 
the total number of citations in each firm-year. Our measures of innovation productivity are consistent with the 
literature (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 1975, Griliches, 1990). 
We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method to investigate the impact of EPL on firm innovation. The 
DID method effectively controls for covariates and allows us to compare innovation outputs between treatment 
and control groups after a change in a country's stringency of labor protection: firms from countries that 
experience a change in EPL (treatment group) versus firms from countries that do not experience a change in 
EPL (control group). The key assumption of the DID method is that, conditional on controls, treated and control 
firms are only randomly different. Our empirical specification controls for relevant firm and country 
characteristics as in prior studies. To mitigate the omitted-variable problem, we also control for firm fixed 
effects to account for the time-invariant firm characteristics and for year fixed effects to absorb systematic 
period effects such as differences in macroeconomic conditions that may affect all sampled firms' innovation 
output. 
We find that treatment firms experience a 5.10% decrease in innovation quantity and a 5.46% decrease in 
innovation quality following a major increase in employment protection relative to a set of control firms 
operating in the same industry at the same time but that are located in countries without changes in 
employment protection. Our findings support the hypothesis that labor protection could impede innovation. 
However, it is possible that our results are driven by the differences in pretreatment trends between treatment 
and control firms. In other words, differences in other dimensions, rather than changes in the stringency of 
employment protection, between the treatment and control firms could drive our results. To mitigate this 
concern, we employ a dynamics analysis to examine the timing of the relation between changes in employment 
protection and innovation. We find (1) there is a significant decrease in innovation one and two years after the 
passage of EPL; and (2) the coefficient estimates of the 1- and 2-year forward values of EPL are not significant, 
suggesting that there is no significant change in innovation prior to the passage of EPL. 
We propose two channels for our findings. The first channel is inventor shirking. Strong labor protection could 
encourage shirking due to high dismissal costs, which would in turn lead to a reduction in innovation. 
Specifically, we find that at the inventor level, there is a significant decrease in innovation productivity following 
a major increase in the stringency of labor protection. The second channel is distorted job flow. Successful 
innovation requires new technology as well as inventors equipped with the appropriate skill sets. To maintain 
innovation performance, firms need to hire talented inventors in a timely manner. However, high dismissal costs 
distort the job market by discouraging firms from laying off unproductive inventors and hiring skilled ones. The 
distortion in labor flow leads to an inefficient use of corporate resources and a reduction in value added per 
worker (e.g., Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993, Cingano et al., 2010a). Using the number of new hires and new 
leavers as proxies for the distortion in labor flow, we find that there is a significant decrease in new hires and 
new leavers following the enhancement of labor protection. In addition, we find that firms are less likely to hire 
more productive inventors and less productive inventors are less likely to leave their current jobs after the 
enhancement of labor protection. Taken together, the results suggest that inventor shirking and distorted job 
flow after the enhancement of EPL could be the underlying channels through which labor protection affects firm 
innovation. 
We conduct four cross-sectional tests to provide further support for our findings. First, we examine whether the 
negative impact varies conditional on the reliance on external financing. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that 
firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to rely on external financing. Acharya and Xu (2017) find 
that public firms that are more dependent on external financing exhibit better innovation performance than a 
sample of matched private firms. Simintzi et al. (2015) find that employment protection reduces 
corporate financial leverage. Therefore, we predict that the negative impact of EPL on firm innovation should be 
more pronounced in firms with a strong reliance on external financing. We find supporting evidence for this 
prediction. Second, given the direct impact of R&D expenditures on corporate innovation, we conjecture that 
the negative impact of labor protection on innovation is stronger in R&D-intensive firms than in non-R&D-
intensive counterparts. The results are consistent with our conjecture. Third, we examine whether the negative 
impact varies across different industries. The 2008 National Science Foundation Business R&D and Innovation 
Survey (BRDIS) indicates that firms in manufacturing industries are more innovative than their 
nonmanufacturing counterparts.3 We expect the negative impact of labor protection on corporate innovation to 
be stronger in manufacturing industries. Our findings are consistent with this expectation. Fourth, we examine 
whether the negative impact differs in civil law versus common law countries. Botero et al. (2004) show 
that labor laws are generally stronger in civil law countries than common law countries. We find that the 
negative relation is much stronger for firms in civil law countries than their counterparts in common law 
countries. Our results are also robust to using an alternative subsample, alternative measures of labor 
protection stringency and innovation, and alternative empirical specifications. In summary, our evidence 
supports the hypothesis that stringent labor laws impede firm innovation. 
Our paper relates broadly to three strands of the financial economics literature: (1) the literature on the real 
effect of EPL, (2) the literature on law and innovation, and (3) the literature on labor protection and innovation. 
First, our paper relates to studies examining the real effects of EPL. For example, literature has shown that 
stringent EPL reduces corporate investment and productivity (Besley and Burgess, 2004), affects 
corporate financing decisions (Simintzi et al., 2015), and impedes corporate takeover activities (Dessaint et al., 
2017). Our study adds to this line of research by showing that EPL has a negative impact on corporate 
innovation. 
Second, our paper is related to the literature on the role of laws in fostering/stifling innovation. For example, 
prior studies show that personal bankruptcy law (Fan and White, 2003), debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws 
(Acharya and Subramanian, 2009), antitakeover laws (Atanassov, 2013, Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian, 
2014), intellectual property protection laws (Fang et al., 2017) and trade secret laws (Png, 2017) affect 
innovation. Our paper extends this line of research by examining the impact of labor laws on innovation. The 
studies closest to ours are those by Atanassov (2013) and Sapra et al. (2014). However our paper is significantly 
different from these studies on two accounts. First their work examine how the enhanced job security for 
managers due to the passage of antitakeover laws affects innovation. In contrast our paper focuses primarily on 
the impact of labor protection for general employees. Second, their research question is whether the threat of 
hostile takeover as a disciplining mechanism affects managers’ incentive to innovate, whereas ours is whether 
the significant changes in the costs of firing employees and the flexibility of hiring new ones due to labor reforms 
hinder innovation. 
Third, our paper adds to the literature debating the relationship between labor protection and innovation. On 
the positive side, existing literature finds that labor protection promotes innovation. For example, Acharya et al. 
(2014) use the staggered adoption of wrongful discharge laws across U.S. states and find that wrongful 
discharge laws, which reduce the possibility of holdup, spur innovation at the firm level. On the negative side, 
studies show that labor protection reduces productivity and impedes innovation. For 
example, Riphahn (2005) provides evidence that provisions against layoff during a probationary period reduce 
the productivity of new hires by dampening their efforts due to a reduced likelihood of being 
fired. Bradley et al. (2016) find that labor unions impede corporate innovation and attribute their findings to an 
ex ante underinvestment in R&D, employee shirking, and a reduction in wage inequality. Our paper contributes 
to the ongoing debate by documenting a negative impact of EPL on innovation. 
Our paper is closely related to Acharya et al. (2013) who find that dismissal laws in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany limit employers’ ability to hold up innovating employees and thereby foster 
innovation at the country level. Our study is distinct from their work in two important ways. First, we focus on 
the effect of EPL on individual firms. Given the heterogeneity at the firm level, the positive relation between 
dismissal laws and innovation at the country level may not generalize to the firm level. Their macro-level 
evidence may derive from an efficient provision of public goods. In addition, a micro-level probe enables us to 
exploit heterogeneities across firms to examine the conditions under which the effect of EPL is more 
pronounced. Second, we focus on 20 OECD countries. Using a large sample with more country-level 
heterogeneities, we are able to better examine the real effect EPL has on innovation in an international setting. 
We do not include the United States in our sample for two reasons, First, Fisher et al. (2016) show that there is a 
clear distinction in labor laws between the United States and the European Union. Namely, labor laws in the 
United States are employer-friendly while labor laws in the European Union are very protective of employees. 
Second, the dominance of U.S. firms in terms of the number of firms and patents would raise the concern that 
our findings are driven solely by U.S. firms.4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes sample selection and reports summary 
statistics; Section 3 discusses our empirical findings; and Section 4 concludes. 
2. Sample selection and summary statistics 
2.1. Sample selection 
We start the sample construction process with the intersection of a European patent database and the 
Compustat Global database. We collect patent information from the European Patent and Trademark Office 
(https://www.epo.org/index.html).5 We merge the patent data with the Compustat Global database, which is 
the common source for global financial data from 1987 onward. We use fuzzy matching by firm names, carefully 
inspect all automatic matches, and perform any remaining matches manually. We then keep the observations 
for 20 OECD countries whose EPL index is available. Our final sample consists of 90,752 firm-year observations, 
including 13,105 unique firms across 20 countries for the period from 1987 through 2003. 
2.2. Variable measurement 
2.2.1. Measuring innovation 
We extract innovation data from the latest version of the European patent database. The database covers 
published European patent applications as well as published international applications that are seeking patent 
protection via the European Patent Office.6 It also provides detailed information including filing date, granted 
date, assignee's information, inventor name, inventor location, number of citations received, affiliated company 
name, and other patent-relevant information. Our choice is driven by two factors. The first factor is sample 
structure. Sixteen out of twenty OECD countries in this study are European countries, so it is more reasonable to 
use the patent data compiled by the European Patent Office. The second factor is the validity of 
patents. Jaffe and Lerner (2004) document that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has been issuing too many 
invalid patents that fail to meet the patentability requirements. Frakes and Wasserman (2017) find that 
although it has similar patentability requirements, the European Patent Office expends greater resources to 
scrutinize patent application than the United States.7 
To measure a firm's quantity and quality of innovation, we construct two variables: (1) the natural logarithm of 
patents applied; and (2) the natural logarithm of number of citations received for each firm-year.8 Patent 
application have on average a 2- or 3-year lag from the time of submission to the patent office until the time it is 
actually granted. Citations tend to accumulate over a long period of time (e.g., 50 years), but the citations we 
can observe at best are those received up to 2010. Therefore, we adjust our two measurements of innovation to 
address this truncation bias. We follow Hall et al., 2001, Hall et al., 2005) and correct the truncation problem by 
using a fixed-effects approach. We divide the number of patent (citation counts) for each firm-year by the mean 
number of patents (citation counts) of all firms for that country-year. 
2.2.2. Measuring the stringency of labor protection 
To measure the stringency of labor protection that varies over time and across countries, we utilize the EPL 
index in Allard (2005), which covers eighteen aspects of employment protection legislation grouped into three 
broad categories: laws protecting workers with regular contracts, laws protecting workers with temporary 
contracts, and regulations applying to collective dismissals.9 Our choice of EPL index is driven by its superior 
performance in the following three aspects, when compared to other indices for employment protection such 
as Botero et al. (2004) index and Deakin et al. (2007) index. First, the EPL index comprehensively measures all 
country-level changes in EPL from 1950 to 2003, enabling us to explore the within-country correlation between 
changes in labor protection and corporate innovation. In contrast, Botero et al. (2004) index only measures the 
stringency of employment protection in 1997. Second, the EPL index covers all aspects of employment 
protection legislation across 21 OECD countries. In contrast, Deakin et al. (2007) index is only available for five 
countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and India. Third, the EPL index has been 
widely used in studies that examine the economic impact of employment protection such as Alimov, 
2005, Simintzi et al., 2015, Dessaint et al., 2017, and Subramanian and Megginson (2018). 
To capture either a positive or negative effect of any labor law changes, we follow the spirit of Simintzi et al. 
(2015) and create a variable, EPL_C, which equals 1 (0) after (before) the EPL index increases in a country-year 
and equals −1 (0) after (before) the EPL index decreases in a country-year. As noted in the construction of the 
EPL index in Allard (2005), many countries experienced trivial changes that may not have a significant effect on 
labor protection. To better gauge the impact of labor protection on innovation, we only consider changes in the 
EPL index whose absolute value is greater than 0.2 (the absolute mean value of the change of the EPL index). If a 
country experiences more than two changes of EPL in the opposite direction during our sample period, we 
include the largest change only. As a robustness check, we also use the EPL index in Allard (2005), which is 
labeled as EPL_A. Higher values of EPL_A indicate more stringent labor protection for workers. It is notable that 
the main difference between EPL_C and EPL_A is that EPL_C focuses on large changes in EPL, 
whereas EPL_A considers all changes. The results for EPL_A are reported in Table 7, Panel D. 
2.2.3. Measuring other control variables 
In measuring the effect of labor protection on innovation, we include an extensive set of control variables. At 
the firm level, the control variables include the natural logarithm of firm assets in U.S. dollars (LnAssets), return 
on assets (ROA), market-to-book ratio (MB), property, plant, and equipment scaled by assets (Tangibility), 
firm leverage (Leverage), R&D expenses scaled by assets (R&D), and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on the 
two-digit SIC code (HHI). The choice of these variables is based on the existing innovation literature. For 
example, Beck et al., 2005, Beck et al., 2008) and find that firm size plays a critical role in shaping a firm's long-
term growth. Small firms are generally more financially constrained and are therefore less likely to undertake 
costly innovative projects given their uncertain outcome. Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of firm assets 
as a proxy for the uncertainty level in conducting risky projects. Growth firms generally rely extensively on 
external financing (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In addition, the success of an innovative project is highly 
correlated with financing ability and sustainability of the firm. We use the market-to-book ratio to control for a 
firm's growth opportunity. Fang et al. (2014) raise the question about the suitability of R&D expenditures as a 
proxy for innovation productivity. Bradley et al. (2016) further differentiates R&D expenditures as input for 
innovation from patents and citations that are output for innovation. Therefore, we include R&D expenditures 
scaled by assets in our regression. Aghion et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence that market competition and 
innovation exhibit a U-shaped relationship. On the contrary, Hashmi (2013) finds a mild negative relationship 
between competition and innovation. To account for the effect of market competition on innovation, we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a proxy for the degree of product market competition. 
At the country level, the control variables include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (LnGDP_Capita), the 
natural logarithm of country-level cumulative patents in the past 5 years (LnPatentStock5), public spending on 
secondary and tertiary education scaled by GDP (Ed_Share), the intellectual property protection index (IP), 
international trade (Trade), an indicator for the political orientation of the ruling party (Right), and the 
disproportionality of the electoral system (Disp_Index). The inclusion of the above macro-level variables follows 
the existing literature. For example, Furman et al. (2002) find that a country's knowledge stock is critical for 
fostering innovation. They use GDP per capita to capture the ability of a country to translate its knowledge stock 
into economic development. GDP per capita also captures the variations in macroeconomic conditions across 
countries. The stock of international patents (LnPatentStock5) is employed to directly measure a country's pool 
of new technology. Furman et al. (2002) also suggest that the intensity of human capital investment and the 
strength of protection for intellectual property could affect the national innovative capacity. Following their 
paper, we also include the fraction of GDP spent on secondary and tertiary education (Ed_Share) and an 
intellectual property protection index (IP) in our baseline regressions. MacGarvie (2006) finds that a country's 
international trade is a conduit for the diffusion of technological knowledge and is correlated with citations of 
that country's patents. We add trade as a control; it is constructed by taking the difference between the level of 
imports and the level of exports scaled by GDP in a country-year. Evidence in Krozner and 
Strahan (1999) suggests that political economy variables are linked to regulatory changes. Perotti and Von 
Thadden (2006) argue that labor market structures are usually shaped by political decisions. To measure political 
environment, we use an indicator variable (Right) for the ideology of the political party in power that equals one 
if it is right leaning and zero otherwise. This variable essentially captures the sentiment in the country toward 
labor protection and the current government's leaning toward passing economic regulations that could affect 
innovation. In addition, Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that weak employment protection is likely to occur in 
countries with majoritarian rather than proportional electoral rules. We therefore further control for the 
disproportionality of the electoral system (Disp_Index) in a country by using the c Index developed 
by Gallagher and Mitchell (2008). In our robustness analysis, we consider several possible omitted 
variables. Acharya et al. (2013) argue that changes in labor laws may be correlated with business cycles in a 
country. Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that in emerging countries, corruption is detrimental to innovation. 
Therefore, we control for annual GDP growth (GDP_Growth), unemployment rates (Unemployment), country-
level corruption (Corruption), and an indicator of recessions (Recession).10 This indicator equals one if a country 
experiences two consecutive quarters with negative GDP growth and zero otherwise. All variables, except for 
those normalized by the natural logarithm, are winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentile value. Detailed 
definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix B. 
2.3. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for all variables during our sample period. The EPL index (EPL_A) varies 
from 0.500 (lowest) to 4.100 (highest), and the mean and median values are 1.664 and 1.400, respectively. This 
wide range in the EPL index indicates a large variation in the strictness of labor laws across countries. The mean 
value of EPL_C is −0.172. On average, a firm files 2.464 patents and receives 6.419 citations. The mean value of 
total assets is about $2012 million. The proportion of R&D expenditures represents about 1.1% of total assets. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Pat (Patent) 2.464 0.000 27.600 0.000 1729.000 
Cite (Citation) 6.419 0.000 69.672 0.000 3572.000 
EPL_C −0.172 0.000 0.652 −1.000 1.000 
EPL_A 1.664 1.400 0.636 0.500 4.100 
Assets (US $ million) 2012.670 246.371 6799.470 1.668 53053.540 
ROA 0.027 0.046 0.145 −0.819 0.288 
MB 1.553 0.586 3.017 0.000 20.703 
Tangibility 0.315 0.280 0.236 0.000 0.937 
Leverage 0.228 0.206 0.183 0.000 0.729 
R&D 0.011 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.236 
HHI 0.277 0.176 0.269 0.020 1.000 
LnGDP_Capita 10.194 10.205 0.264 8.709 10.822 
LnPatentStock5 9.744 9.924 1.424 3.135 11.563 
Ed_Share 0.408 0.395 0.094 0.105 0.802 
IP 4.286 4.420 0.433 1.670 4.670 
Trade 1.352 1.324 2.966 −11.101 17.184 
Right 0.557 1.000 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Disp_Index 10.635 10.870 5.253 0.420 25.250       
This table presents summary statistics for the key variables used in this study. The sample is constructed from the 
intersection of the European Patent Database and Compustat Global, after imposing requisite data requirements. The 
sample consists of 90,752 firm-year observations in 13,105 unique firms across 20 OECD countries from 1987 to 2003. 
Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix B. All variables, except for those normalized by natural 
logarithm, are winsorized at the one percent level at each tail. 
 
In Table 2, we report the distribution of EPL stringency and innovation output by country. The most innovative 
country in our sample is Germany, where on average, a firm files 8.978 patents and receives 18.152 citations. 
Additionally, the mean values of EPL_A and EPL_C are 2.242 and −0.703, respectively. On the other hand, the 
least innovative country is Portugal, which reported no successful patent applications during our sample period. 
In general, European countries have more stringent employment protection than other OECD countries. For 
example, Greece has the strongest job security for workers (EPL_A = 3.8), whereas New Zealand has the 
weakest employee protection (EPL_A = 0.737). 
Table 2. EPL indicators and innovation by Country. 
Country Name N EPL_C EPL_A Patent Citation 
Australia (AUS) 5236 0.903 1.154 0.048 0.152 
Austria (AUT) 714 0.000 2.546 0.417 0.819 
Belgium (BEL) 854 0.662 2.497 1.724 4.412 
Canada (CAN) 13,346 0.000 1.200 0.266 0.829 
Switzerland (CHE) 1731 0.886 1.431 3.284 10.070 
Germany (DEU) 5275 −0.703 2.242 8.978 18.152 
Denmark (DNK) 1097 −0.981 1.613 2.006 8.237 
Spain (ESP) 1314 −0.762 2.525 0.067 0.116 
Finland (FIN) 893 0.000 2.300 6.727 30.010 
France (FRA) 4957 0.998 2.993 2.407 5.534 
U.K. (GBR) 17,086 0.000 1.343 0.680 2.493 
Greece (GRC) 703 0.000 3.800 0.003 0.000 
Ireland (IRL) 694 −0.412 1.425 1.784 5.376 
Italy (ITA) 1653 −0.728 3.381 0.893 1.815 
Japan (JPN) 29,298 −0.650 1.435 4.207 11.022 
Netherland (NLD) 2035 0.532 2.275 1.267 2.973 
Norway (NOR) 1045 0.000 2.716 0.810 1.858 
New Zealand (NZL) 596 0.000 0.737 0.025 0.065 
Portugal (PRT) 398 −0.990 3.704 0.000 0.000 
Sweden (SWE) 1827 −0.948 2.787 2.031 5.186 
This table presents the country distribution of EPL indicators (EPL_C and EPL_A) and firm innovation measures 
(Patent and Citation). See Appendix I for all variable definitions and descriptions. 
3. Empirical results 
3.1. Baseline regression results 
In the baseline regression model, we utilize a difference-in-differences (DID) method, which allows us to 
compare innovation output between treatment and control groups after a change in a country's EPL index 
(either tightening or relaxation). That is, firms from countries that experience a change in the EPL index 
(treatment group) versus firms from countries that do not experience a change in the EPL index (control group). 
Inspired by Simintzi et al. (2015), we specify the DID regression model as follows: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑁𝑁 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑁𝑁 , 
where i denotes a firm, t denotes a year, and k is a country. The dependent variable 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑁𝑁 is 
the measure of a firm's innovation output in year t + N (N = 0, 1, 2); EPL_C is the indicator for major changes in 
the EPL index; the key variable of interest; Xi, t is the vector of control variables; α is the constant; μi is the 
firm fixed effects; δt is the year fixed effects; and ∈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑁𝑁 is the error term. The vector Xi, t includes both firm- and 
country-level control variables as described in the previous section. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level because labor laws change at the country level. 
The results of the baseline regression are reported in Table 3. The coefficients of EPL_C are all negative and 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level. Our results are also economically nontrivial. For example, in 
Column (1), we find that on average, patent counts for firms in the treatment group decline (increase) by 5.1% 
relative to those in the control group after a tightening (relaxation) in the stringency of employment protection. 
In Column (3), we also find consistent evidence showing that the number of citations received significantly 
decreases (increases) by 5.46% for the treatment group after the EPL index increases (declines). These results 
suggest that employee-friendly labor reform hinders corporate innovation in both quantity and quality. 
Table 3. The impact of labor protection on firm innovation. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
LnPatt+N   LnCitet+N    
N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 
EPL_C −0.0510** −0.0537*** −0.0516*** −0.0546*** −0.0564*** −0.0511***  
(−2.72) (−3.13) (−3.05) (−3.43) (−3.38) (−3.08) 
LnAssets 0.0343** 0.0337** 0.0312** 0.0343** 0.0313** 0.0270**  
(2.55) (2.80) (2.85) (2.75) (2.60) (2.68) 
ROA −0.0046 0.0270* 0.0146 −0.0064 0.0328* 0.0212  
(−0.25) (1.74) (0.75) (−0.35) (2.00) (1.17) 
MB 0.0026*** 0.0028*** 0.0024*** 0.0022** 0.0025*** 0.0021***  
(2.92) (5.78) (3.58) (2.76) (4.93) (3.13) 
Tangibility −0.0216 −0.0254 −0.0300 −0.0094 −0.0176 −0.0231  
(−1.25) (−1.09) (−1.22) (−0.53) (−0.86) (−1.22) 
Leverage −0.0934* −0.0916** −0.0813*** −0.0829** −0.0850** −0.0734***  
(−1.96) (−2.81) (−3.23) (−2.12) (−2.42) (−2.87) 
R&D 0.8614*** 0.6356* 0.3714 0.9321*** 0.6158** 0.3402  
(3.55) (1.85) (1.02) (2.95) (2.10) (1.07) 
HHI 0.0064 0.0227 0.0179 0.0153 0.0285 0.0294  
(0.24) (0.99) (0.76) (0.87) (1.45) (1.26) 
LnGDP_Capita 0.0267 0.0219 0.0316 0.0052 0.0161 0.0264  
(0.68) (0.56) (0.84) (0.13) (0.41) (0.75) 
LnPatentStock5 −0.0117 −0.0092 −0.0051 0.0071 −0.0056 0.0033  
(−0.27) (−0.25) (−0.14) (0.20) (−0.17) (0.10) 
Ed_Share 0.0410 −0.0866 −0.0810 −0.0774 −0.0922 −0.1081  
(0.56) (−1.25) (−0.93) (−1.47) (−1.56) (−1.45) 
IP −0.0410 −0.0234 −0.0239 −0.0273 −0.0265 −0.0280  
(−1.71) (−0.95) (−1.03) (−1.52) (−1.51) (−1.29) 
Trade −0.0021 −0.0025 −0.0024 −0.0029 −0.0025 −0.0033  
(−0.98) (−1.21) (−1.03) (−1.58) (−1.21) (−1.54) 
Right −0.0055 0.0020 0.0038 −0.0003 −0.0012 0.0026  
(−0.68) (0.24) (0.45) (−0.03) (−0.14) (0.33) 
Disp_Index −0.0007 0.0003 −0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 −0.0003  
(−0.45) (0.18) (−0.01) (0.66) (0.01) (−0.17) 
Constant −0.1441 −0.1128 −0.2220 −0.1118 −0.0684 −0.2075  
(−0.38) (−0.30) (−0.57) (−0.36) (−0.20) (−0.62) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R-squared 0.687 0.791 0.797 0.772 0.776 0.782 
This table presents the baseline results of the difference-in-differences (DID) regression model. In columns (1), (2), and (3), 
the dependent variable is LnPatt+N, the natural logarithm of patents applied for by a firm in year t + N (N = 0, 1, 2). In 
columns (4), (5), and (6), the dependent variable is LnCitet+N, the natural logarithm of citations received by a firm in year 
t + N (N = 0, 1, 2). All variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Each regression includes firm and year fixed effects. 
Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level clustering. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Our findings contrast with those in Acharya et al. (2013). To identify what drives the inconsistency, we replicate 
their baseline results using European patent data. The results are reported in Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) 
of Appendix C. Consistent with their findings, the stringency of dismissal laws has a positive impact on 
innovation. For the sake of direct comparison, in Columns (3) and (4) we replace the dismissal law index with the 
EPL index in Allard (2005) and find that at the country level, labor protection also positively affects innovation. 
However, when we extend the sample by including another 17 OECD countries, as shown in Columns (5) and (6), 
the sign of the coefficient estimates of EPL becomes negative, suggesting that the addition of more 
heterogeneous countries could at least partially contribute to the reverse findings in Acharya et al. (2013). We 
also examine whether the country-level evidence in Acharya et al. (2013) can be generalized to the firm level. 
Specifically, using a large sample of firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, we 
rerun our baseline DID regression model and find that EPL continues to have a negative impact on innovation, 
whereas dismissal laws are no longer effective in fostering innovation (See Appendix C, Panel B). The results 
suggest that 1) the dismissal law index is not as effective as the EPL index in accounting for the firm-level 
heterogeneity; and 2) firm-level heterogeneity within a country and across countries could also be contributing 
to the contrasting findings between the two studies. 
3.2. Dynamic model 
The advantage of the DID method in Table 3 is that it allows us to directly compare the change in innovation in 
firms that are subject to labor law reforms (treated firms) with the change in innovation in firms that do not 
experience such reforms (control firms). Nevertheless, one remaining concern is that our results are driven by 
pretreatment differences in the characteristics of treated and control firms. In other words, differences in other 
dimensions, rather than changes in labor protection between the treatment and control firms could be driving 
our results. 
To address this concern, we employ a dynamic model that enables us to examine the dynamics of innovation in 
years around the changes in labor protection laws. As such, we follow Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and Simintzi et al. (2015) and include lead and lags of the testing variables in our DID 
specification. More specifically, we replace EPL_C with five variables: EPL_C (+2) is the 2-year forward value 
of EPL_C; EPL_C (+1) is the 1-year forward value of EPL_C; EPL_C (0) is the contemporaneous value of EPL_C; 
EPL_C (−1) is the 1-year lagged value of EPL_C; and EPL_C (−2) is the 2-year lagged value of EPL_C. We also 
include other control variables and fixed effects as in the baseline DID regression model. Standard errors are still 
clustered at the country level. The results in Table 4 show that there are no changes in innovation 
output prior to labor law reforms because the coefficient estimates of EPL_C (+2) and EPL_C (+1) are statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence suggesting that our results are driven by pretreatment trends and 
reverse causality. In contrast, the coefficient estimates of EPL_C (−2), EPL_C (−1) and EPL_C (0) are negative and 
significant, indicating that changes in labor protection affect innovation output. Taken together, our findings 
suggest that employee-friendly labor laws impede corporate innovation. This evidence is consistent with the 
findings of Autor et al., 2007, Bassanini et al., 2009, and Calcagnini et al. (2014), which show that strong 
employment protection leads to a reduction in corporate productivity. 
Table 4. Dynamic analysis. 
 
(1) (2)  
LnPat LnCite 
EPL_C (+ 2) 0.0013 0.0015  
(0.20) (0.27) 
EPL_C (+ 1) 0.0029 0.0020  
(1.18) (0.80) 
EPL_C (0) −0.0370** −0.0393***  
(−2.26) (−2.90) 
EPL_C (−1) −0.0256*** −0.0284***  
(−3.04) (−2.96) 
EPL_C (−2) −0.0052*** −0.0050**  
(−2.93) (−2.60) 
LnAssets 0.0415** 0.0408**  
(2.41) (2.62) 
ROA −0.0102 −0.0143  
(−0.49) (−0.70) 
MB 0.0022*** 0.0014**  
(3.14) (2.81) 
Tangibility −0.0202 −0.0060  
(−0.84) (−0.27) 
Leverage −0.1177* −0.1012**  
(−1.97) (−2.26) 
R&D 0.8225** 0.8611** 
 
(2.38) (2.10) 
HHI −0.0022 0.0109  
(−0.08) (0.58) 
LnGDP_Capita 0.0221 −0.0013  
(0.56) (−0.03) 
LnPatentStock5 −0.0137 −0.0178  
(−0.25) (−0.41) 
Ed_Share 0.1134 0.0146  
(1.33) (0.25) 
IP −0.0430 −0.0277  
(−1.50) (−1.26) 
Trade −0.0036 −0.0034  
(−1.67) (−1.59) 
Right −0.0108 −0.0059  
(−1.22) (−0.72) 
Disp_Index −0.0018 −0.0015  
(−1.08) (−1.14) 
Constant −0.0394 0.2726  
(−0.08) (0.65) 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Observations 76,014 76,014 
Adj. R-squared 0.703 0.789 
This table reports the results of regressions of firm innovation on the two-year lagged, one-year lagged, the 
contemporaneous, and the one-year and two-year forward values of the EPL_C indicator. The dependent variables are 
LnPat and LnCite in columns (1) and 2), respectively. All variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Each regression 
includes firm and year fixed effects. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and country-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
3.3. Potential channels 
In this subsection, we investigate potential channels through which changes in labor protection could impact 
firm innovation. We first test innovation productivity before and after EPL-index changes at the individual 
inventor level. Riphahn (2005) shows that an “anti-layoff” clause during probationary period causes lower 
productivity induced by shirking. Cingano et al. (2010b) document that an increase in EPL leads to a reduction in 
a firm's productivity, measured as investment per worker and capital per worker. Bradley et al. (2016) also 
support this view by showing that labor unionization discourages employees from expending effort on 
innovation because of the lowered probability of dismissal. We conjecture that strong job security leads to 
inventor shirking and thus decreases innovation. 
Following Bernstein (2015), we classify an inventor as Stayers if he/she does not change employment affiliation 
during our sample period. We then delete stayers who only produce one patent during our sample period and 
the stayers who only have one stayer-year observation. The stayers from the treatment (control) group must 
have at least a 5-year patent invention history before and after labor law reforms. We then aggregate the total 
number of patents invented by each stayer and the total number of citations received by those patents. By 
limiting our sample to Stayers, we are able to test the effect of labor law reforms on stayers’ innovation 
productivity. The model specification is the same as the baseline DID regression model except that we replace 
firm fixed effects with inventor fixed effects to account for the impact of inventors’ characteristics on 
innovation. The results are reported in Table 5, Panel A. In Column (1), where the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of patents (LnPat), the coefficient estimate of EPL_C is −0.0207 and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level, indicating that stringent labor laws have a negative impact on innovation performance of Stayer. In 
Column (2), we replace the natural logarithm of patents (LnPat) with the natural logarithm of citations (LnCite) 
and rerun the regression. We find consistent results. More specifically, we find that the number of citations 
significantly decreases by 5.16% following the tightening of EPL. These results are consistent with those reported 
by Bassanini et al. (2009), which show that due to high dismissal costs, strong employment protection laws 
reduce labor productivity as measured by aggregate total factor productivity. 
Table 5. Potential channels: inventor-level evidence. 
 
  (1) (2)  
  LnPat LnCite 
Panel A: Innovation 
of Stayers 
    
EPL_C   −0.0207*** −0.0516**  
  (−3.38) (−2.23) 
LnAssets   0.0025 −0.0138  
  (0.25) (−1.09) 
ROA   0.0017 0.2200  
  (0.02) (1.69) 
MB   0.0001 0.0013  
  (0.09) (0.52) 
Tangibility   −0.0878 −0.2473  
  (−1.03) (−1.28) 
Leverage   −0.0374* −0.0403  
  (−1.80) (−0.69) 
R&D   −0.2927 −0.0907  
  (−1.32) (−0.16) 
HHI   0.0380 −0.0603  
  (0.79) (−0.50) 
LnGDP_Capita   −0.0697*** −0.0831**  
  (−4.80) (−2.68) 
LnPatentStock5   0.0766* 0.1938*  
  (1.88) (1.80) 
Ed_Share   0.2752*** 0.4217***  
  (3.13) (2.96) 
IP   0.0003 −0.0118  
  (0.03) (−0.44) 
Trade   −0.0015 0.0045*  
  (−1.70) (2.07) 
Right   0.0107*** 0.0209** 
 
  (4.92) (2.25) 
Disp_Index   0.0010 0.0065  
  (0.56) (1.24) 
Constant   0.2998 0.0827  
  (0.87) (0.09) 
Inventor FE   YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES 
Observations   48,326 48,326 
Adj. R-squared   0.261 0.224  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
LnNewHires LnLeavers LnNewHires_Productive LnLeavers_Unproductive 
Panel B: inventor turnover     
EPL_C −0.1311*** −0.0287*** −0.0509** −0.0683***  
(−3.33) (−4.69) (−2.80) (−4.62) 
LnAssets 0.0568 −0.0103* 0.0722* −0.0079  
(1.46) (−1.98) (1.78) (−0.63) 
ROA 0.0408 0.0020 −0.0112 −0.0333**  
(1.21) (0.20) (−0.67) (−2.13) 
MB 0.0030** 0.0000 0.0008 −0.0015  
(2.41) (0.07) (0.74) (−1.70) 
Tangibility −0.0976 −0.0271 −0.1409* −0.0408  
(−1.14) (−1.36) (−1.78) (−1.00) 
Leverage −0.0821* 0.0104 −0.0564* 0.0274  
(−1.88) (1.23) (−1.86) (0.71) 
R&D 0.8801* 0.0472 0.4874 −0.2324  
(1.96) (1.01) (1.41) (−1.41) 
HHI 0.1210** 0.0066 0.0787 −0.0181  
(2.26) (0.97) (1.17) (−0.54) 
LnGDP_Capita −0.0318 0.0300 −0.1081* −0.0568  
(−0.33) (1.63) (−1.92) (−1.19) 
LnPatentStock5 0.0618 −0.0115 0.0535 −0.0317  
(0.55) (−0.73) (0.88) (−0.59) 
Ed_Share 0.4862** 0.1413*** 0.4399* 0.1771  
(2.22) (3.80) (1.79) (1.09) 
IP −0.0507 0.0171 −0.0831** −0.0321  
(−0.89) (1.63) (−2.72) (−0.93) 
Trade −0.0063 −0.0014 0.0067 0.0081**  
(−1.16) (−1.12) (1.42) (2.84) 
Right 0.0174 −0.0015 −0.0082 −0.0152  
(0.87) (−0.36) (−0.48) (−1.09) 
Disp_Index 0.0108 0.0024 0.0056 0.0036  
(1.57) (1.72) (1.55) (1.53) 
Constant −0.6672 −0.2519 0.5221 1.0535  
(−0.72) (−1.42) (0.80) (1.61) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 26,311 26,311 26,311 26,311 
Adj. R-squared 0.454 0.039 0.562 0.048 
This table reports the results for channels tests of inventor shirking and labor market distortion. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is the innovation performance of the Stayers. Stayers are defined as inventors who have not changed their 
affiliation during our sample period. In column (1), the dependent variable is LnPat, which is the natural logarithm of 
patents applied by a firm's Stayers in a year. In column (2), the dependent variable is LnCite, the natural logarithm of 
citations received by a firm's Stayers in a year. Each regression includes inventor and year fixed effects. In Panel B, the 
dependent variables are proxies for inventor turnover in the labor market. In Column (1), the dependent variable is 
LnNewHires, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of newly hired inventors for a firm-year. In column (2), the 
dependent variable is LnLeavers, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of inventors left in a firm-year. In column 
(3), the dependent variable is LnNewHires_Productive, the natural logarithm of one plus the number of newly hired 
productive inventors for a firm-year. In column (4), the dependent variable is LnLeavers_Unproductive, the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of unproductive inventors left in a firm-year. We define as productive inventors the 
newly hired inventors whose number of patents is above the median value of patents applied for in the past by newly hired 
inventors. Unproductive inventors are the new leavers whose number of patents is below the median value of patents 
applied for in the past by new leavers. In Panel B, each regression includes firm and year fixed effects. For both Panels, 
below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level clustering. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Second, we test whether high dismissal costs result in a decline of a firm's labor flow. Autor et al. (2007) contend 
that strong EPL increases firing costs that distort firms’ firing and hiring decisions, leading to the inefficient use 
of corporate resources. In this test, we adopt the same model specification as the baseline DID regression 
model. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 5 present the results of the DID regression with LnNewHires and 
LnLeavers as the dependent variable, respectively. We define LnNewHires as the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of inventors that firms hire and LnLeavers as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
inventors that leave firms each year during our sample period.11 To be included in the treatment group, both the 
new hires and leavers must invent at least one patent before and after the EPL reforms. We also limit the 
sample to those firms providing the information of inventors who change affiliations during our sample period. 
Column (1) in Table 5 Panel B shows that firms hire significantly fewer inventors due to the EPL tightening. This 
evidence is consistent with the findings of Autor et al. (2007) that show a decrease in state employment 
following the adoption of wrongful discharge laws by U.S. states. Results reported in Column (2) indicate that 
after tightening in the EPL, there is a decline in the likelihood of inventors' leaving their current jobs. However, 
given the fact that we cannot distinguish forced leavers from voluntary leavers due to the lack of relevant 
information in the European patent database, it is impossible to directly test whether changes in EPL result in an 
increase or decrease in forced layoffs. Instead, we interpret this result as evidence that enhanced EPL reduces 
inventor turnover. 
To provide additional evidence, we examine whether firms are less likely to hire more-productive inventors and 
whether less-productive inventors are less likely to leave their current jobs after the enhancement of EPL. The 
tests are in the same spirit of those in Gao et al. (2018) who examine whether smoke-free laws promote 
innovation by attracting more productive inventors. Columns (3) and (4) in Panel B of Table 5 present the results 
of the DID regression with LnNewHires_Productive and LnLeavers_Unproductive as the dependent variable, 
respectively. We define LnNewHires_Productive as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of productive 
inventors that firms hire and LnLeavers_Unproductive as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
unproductive inventors that leave firms each year during our sample period. A newly hired inventor is a 
productive inventor if her/his total number of patents invented in the previous years (before this inventor 
changed her/his affiliation) is above the median value of patents invented in the previous years among all newly 
hired inventors.12 Unproductive leavers are the new leavers whose number of patents invented in the previous 
years is below the median value of patents invented in the previous years among all leavers. The results in 
columns (3) and (4) in Table 5, Panel B show that high dismissal costs due to the tightening of EPL make firms 
less likely to hire productive inventors and more likely to retain unproductive inventors. Taken together, strong 
labor protection causes labor market distortion and thereby limits firms’ ability to innovate. 
3.4. Subsample analyses 
In this subsection, we explore the conditions under which the relationship between labor protection and 
innovation varies. Specifically, we conduct four subsample analyses. First, we examine how reliance on external 
financing plays a role in our context. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that firms with more growth opportunities 
are more likely to rely on external financing. Acharya and Xu (2017) find that public firms that are more 
dependent on external financing exhibit better innovation performance than a sample of matched private firms. 
Motivated by these studies, we test whether external financing reliance significantly impacts our results. 
Following Moshirian et al. (2014), we construct the variable of external financing reliance, which is defined as 
(capital expenditure + R&D expense -cash flow from operation)/capital expenditure. Based on the median value 
of external financing reliance sorted by industry and year, we divide our sample into two groups: high versus low 
external financing reliance. Consistent with the findings of prior studies, the results in Table 6, Panel A indicate 
that the impact of EPL on innovation is stronger for firms with higher reliance on external financing. 
Table 6. Subsample analyses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
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(−2.67) (−3.26) (−3.41) (−3.90) (−1.75) (−1.17) (−1.88) (−0.15) 
Observatio
ns 
45,367 45,367 45,367 45,367 45,385 45,385 45,385 45,385 
Adj. R2 0.692 0.794 0.771 0.785 0.677 0.799 0.774 0.776 
 Panel B: R&D 
intensity 
       
 
High    Low    




(−1.88) (−2.21) (−2.79) (−2.35) (−1.59) (−1.62) (−1.70) (−1.57) 
Observatio
ns 
25,864 25,864 25,864 25,864 64,888 64,888 64,888 64,888 
Adj. R2 0.739 0.815 0.795 0.800 0.591 0.754 0.721 0.734 
 Panel C: 
Industry 
classification 
       
 Manufacturin
g industry 
   Nonmanufacturi
ng industry 











(−3.06) (−2.90) (−3.59) (−2.95) (−0.27) (−0.44) (−0.30) (−0.57) 
Observatio
ns 
41,799 41,799 41,799 41,799 49,003 49,003 49,003 49,003 
Adj. R2 0.703 0.803 0.777 0.789 0.593 0.691 0.690 0.677 
 Panel D: 
Legal Origins 
       
 
Civil Law    Common Law    






(−2.28) (−2.34) (−3.01) (−2.73) (0.61) (2.28) (−0.19) (1.78) 
Observatio
ns 
53,794 53,794 53,794 53,794 36,958 36,958 36,958 36,958 
Adj. R2 0.685 0.831 0.806 0.815 0.700 0.716 0.686 0.695 
This table reports the results for subsample analyses. LnPatt+N is the natural logarithm of patents applied for by a firm in 
year t + N. LnCitet+N is the natural logarithm of citations received by a firm in year t + N. In Panel A, we divide the sample 
into high versus low reliance on external financing subsamples based on the median value. The measure of external 
financing reliance is calculated as (capital expenditure + R&D expense – cash flow from operation)/capital expenditure. In 
Panel B, we divide the sample into high versus low R&D intensity subsamples based on the median value of R&D expenses. 
In Panel C, the sample is divided into two subsamples: firms in manufacturing industries versus firms in other industries. In 
Panel D, firms are grouped based on their home country's legal origins: civil law versus common law. Other control 
variables are included but omitted for brevity. All variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Each regression includes firm 
and year fixed effects. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
country-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Second, we examine whether the negative impact of labor protection on innovation is stronger in R&D-intensive 
firms than in their non-R&D-intensive counterparts. We conjecture that R&D-intensive firms are more sensitive 
to the effect of enhanced labor protection. Because of missing information regarding R&D input, the R&D 
intensity is highly skewed. Because over 70% of our firm-year observations lack information on R&D input, we 
assign a value of zero if a firm has a missing value for its R&D expenditures. Accordingly, we classify a firm as an 
R&D-intensive firm if its R&D input is nonzero (non-missing value of R&D input) and as a non-R&D-intensive firm 
otherwise. Consistent with our conjecture, the results in Table 6, Panel B show that the negative impact of EPL 
on innovation is concentrated in R&D-intensive firms. 
Third, we investigate whether the negative impact of labor protection on innovation varies by industry. The 
2008 National Science Foundation Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) indicates that firms in 
manufacturing industries are more innovative than their nonmanufacturing counterparts.13 We conjecture that 
the impact is more pronounced in manufacturing industries. Industries are defined as manufacturing if the firm's 
first digit SIC is either 2 or 3 and nonmanufacturing otherwise. The results in Table 6, Panel C are consistent with 
our conjecture. 
Fourth, we examine whether the legal origin of the company's home country causes variations in the impact of 
EPL on innovation. La Porta et al. (1998) show that a country's legal origin, meaning that the country is rooted 
either in civil or common law, shapes the development of domestic laws. Botero et al. (2004) further show that 
labor laws are generally stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. We conjecture that the 
impact of labor protection on innovation is stronger for firms in civil law countries than those in common law 
countries. The results in Table 6, Panel D provide supporting evidence for this conjecture. 
3.5. Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we perform several sensitivity analyses to provide evidence of the robustness of our results. 
Results are shown in Table 7. First, we include firms with headquarters in the United States. Inclusion of U.S. 
observations dramatically increases our sample size but does not alter our results, suggesting that our main 
finding is robust to the alternative sample. The results are in Table 7, Panel A. 
Table 7. Sensitivity analyses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
LnPatt+N  LnCitet+N   
N  = 0 N  = 2 N  = 0 N  = 2 
 Panel A: Including U.S. firms    
EPL_C −0.0480*** −0.0537*** −0.0563*** −0.0543***  
(−4.01) (−4.91) (−5.69) (−4.93) 
Observations 189,861 189,861 189,861 189,861 
Adj. R2 0.732 0.798 0.764 0.777 
 Panel B: Country/Industry fixed effects    
EPL_C −0.0564*** −0.0569*** −0.0590*** −0.0561***  
(−3.35) (−4.26) (−4.80) (−4.30) 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R2 0.686 0.795 0.771 0.781 
 Panel C: Country-specific time trends    
EPL_C −0.0500** −0.0480** −0.0480*** −0.0468**  
(−2.52) (−2.72) (−2.88) (−2.72) 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R2 0.687 0.797 0.772 0.782 
 Panel D: EPL index in Allard (2005)    
EPL_A −0.0838*** −0.0863*** −0.0858*** −0.0754***  
(−6.62) (−7.19) (−7.01) (−6.48) 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R2 0.791 0.800 0.776 0.784 
 Panel E: EPL indicators in Simintzi et al., (2015)    
EPL_S −0.0322 −0.0323** −0.0334** −0.0338**  
(−1.39) (−2.55) (−2.12) (−2.62) 
Observations 109,882 109,882 109,882 109,882 
Adj. R2 0.677 0.791 0.764 0.775 
 Panel F: EPL_C including all changes    
EPL_C −0.0364*** −0.0439*** −0.0399*** −0.0386**  
(−3.18) (−3.47) (−3.26) (−2.84) 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R2 0.687 0.796 0.772 0.782 
 Panel G: Granted patents    
EPL_C −0.0734*** −0.0554*** −0.0582*** −0.0534***  
(−3.87) (−3.29) (−4.32) (−3.55) 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R2 0.714 0.778 0.758 0.762 
 Panel H: Firms having at least one patent    
EPL_C −0.0609 −0.0620* −0.0783** −0.0736**  
(−1.56) (−2.01) (−2.59) (−2.54) 
Observations 25,922 25,922 25,922 25,922 
Adj. R2 0.690 0.766 0.746 0.756 
This table presents results for several robustness tests. In Panel A, we include firms with headquarters in the United States. 
In Panel B, we control for country/industry fixed effects. In Panel C, we add country-specific time trends. In Panels D, E and 
F, we use alternative measures of labor protection stringency respectively: EPL_A (the EPL index in Allard, 2005), EPL_S (EPL 
indicators reconstructed by Simintzi et al. 2015) and EPL_C that includes all changes in EPL index. In Panel G, the dependent 
variable is the number of patents granted (columns (1) and (2)) and number of citations received for those granted patents 
(columns (3) and (4)), respectively. In Panel H, we delete firm observations with zero patents. In columns (1) and (2), the 
dependent variable is LnPatt+N, the natural logarithm of patents applied by a firm in year t + N. In Columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is LnCitet+N, the natural logarithm of citations received by a firm in year t + N. Other control variables are 
included but omitted for brevity. All variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Each regression includes firm and year 
fixed effects. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Second, we control for country/industry fixed effects to account for unobservable country/industry 
characteristics that could influence corporate innovation productivity. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) document that 
unbalanced developments exist in some industries across countries due to natural resources and geographic 
concentration. The results in Table 7, Panel B show that our results are robust to the addition of 
country/industry fixed effects. 
Third, we examine whether different country trends are driving the results. We augment our DID regressions 
with country-specific time trends. The coefficients of EPL_C in Table 7, Panel C remain statistically significant at 
least at the 5% level. 
Fourth, to examine whether our results are robust to alternative measures of labor protection stringency, we 
use the EPL index developed by Allard (2005), the EPL indicators reconstructed by Simintzi et al. (2015) that 
focus on major labor law reforms, and EPL_C, which includes all the changes in the EPL index. The results are 
reported in Table 7, Panel D, Panel E, and Panel F, respectively.14 We find that our results continue to hold. 
Fifth, we examine whether our results are robust to alternative dependent variables. The primary purpose of our 
study is to ascertain whether there is a casual relationship between labor protection and innovation. Therefore, 
to proxy for a firm's innovation tendency, we only keep the eventually granted patents and citations on those 
grants in our sample. In our innovation data, approximately 60% of patents applied for are eventually granted. 
Again, after replacing the dependent variable with the number of patents granted and number of citations 
received for those granted patents, we find consistent results in Table 7, Panel G (the coefficient estimates 
of EPL_C are all negative and significant at least at the 1% level). 
Finally, we limit our analyses to firm observations that have at least one patent during 1987–2003. Because only 
about 30% of our sample firms have more than one patent, we delete firm observations with zero patents and 
rerun our regressions. The results in Table 7, Panel H show that the negative relation between EPL and 
innovation remains significant. As in the aforementioned discussion, we also consider several possible omitted 
macro-variables: annual GDP growth, unemployment rates, country-level corruption, and an indicator of 
recessions. We find that our results still hold after the addition of these variables. The results are reported 
in Appendix D. It is noted that in Panel D column (4), the result for LnPat becomes insignificant after controlling 
the corruption perception index. This is probably due to the fact that we lose more than one-third of sample 
observations. Additionally, in Appendix E, we employ three alternative measures of innovation to examine 
whether our results still hold. To account for the possible nonlinearity relation between firm size and innovation, 
we use as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of patent-weighted citations, LnCitePat, which is 
calculated as the total number of citations received divided by total patent counts for each firm-year. We also 
follow Trajtenberg et al. (1997) and construct another two innovation measures Generality and Originality. 
Generality (Originality) is the Herfindahl index of the citing (cited) patents used to capture dispersion across 
technology classes. The results in Appendix E show that our results are robust to alternative innovation 
measures. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate whether there is a causal relation between labor protection and innovation at the 
firm level. In contrast to the findings of Acharya et al., 2013, Acharya et al., 2014), our findings indicate that 
employee-friendly labor law reform causes a decline in a firm's innovation output. Further examination reveals 
that stringent employment protection laws encourage inventor shirking and distort labor market flow. We also 
find that the negative relation is more pronounced in firms with heavy reliance on external financing, with high 
R&D intensity, in manufacturing industries, and in civil-law countries. Our extensive micro-level evidence 
highlights that strong employment protection impedes corporate innovation. 
Our paper contributes to at least three strands of the financial economics literature. First, our findings provide 
evidence on the real effect of labor protection laws and extend the literature examining whether and how the 
effects of labor protection laws are translated into real economy. Second, our study contributes to the literature 
on law and innovation. Literature has shown that legal environment has a direct impact on innovation (e.g., Fan 
and White, 2003, Acharya and Subramanian, 2009, Atanassov, 2013, Fang et al., 2017 and Png, 2017). Our paper 
extends this line of research by examining the impact of labor laws on innovation. Third, our paper contributes 
to the literature on labor protection and innovation by providing international firm-level evidence to the 
ongoing debate on the relation between labor protection and innovation. Our findings also have important 
policy implications, given that both the European Union and the OECD have put stimulating innovation on their 
agenda and urge member countries to support entrepreneurial and innovative activities. 
Appendix A. A Brief Discussion of the EPL Index Construction in Allard (2005) 
In 1985, the OECD created the original EPL indicator; it only included regular and temporary contracts. In late 
1990 s, the OECD broadened the indicator to include collective dismissals and created a new indicator to cover 
all the main aspects of job security. This new version of the EPL has been available annually only since 1998 and 
is based on the numerical scores of surveys that cover eighteen aspects of employment protection legislation in 
three domains: laws protecting workers with regular contracts, laws protecting workers with temporary 
contracts, and regulations applying to collective dismissals. The final scores are reviewed and corrected if 
necessary by each of the national governments. The weighting scheme is as follows: regular contracts are 
assigned a weight of 5/12, temporary contracts are assigned a weight of 5/12, and collective dismissals are 
weighted at 1/6. To develop a long-time series for researchers to better assess the impact of labor protection on 
the real economy, Allard (2005) collected reliable information on legislative changes for 21 OECD countries over 
50 years and reconstructed the OECD employment protection indicator. More specifically, to assign a score to a 
country-year that is not covered by the OECD EPL indicator, Allard reviewed volumes of legislation and dozens of 
other related publications and attempted to answer the questions in the OECD's surveys. After obtaining scores 
on the three domains, Allard created the EPL index by following the weighting scheme used in the creation of 
OECD EPL indicator. 
Appendix B. Definition of variables. 
Variable Name Description 
LnPatt+N The natural logarithm of patents applied by a firm in year t + N (N = 0,1,2) divided by the 
mean number of patents of all firms in that country-year. [Data Source: European Patent 
Office] 
LnCitet+N The natural logarithm of citations received by a firm in year t + N (N = 0,1,2). [Data 
Source: European Patent Office] 
LnCitePatt+N The natural logarithm of citations per patent applied by a firm in year t + N (N = 0,1,2), 
scaled by the total number of citations per patent received by all patents applied for in 
that country-year. [Data Source: European Patent Office] 
Generality+N The Herfindahl Index of the citing patents used to capture dispersion across technology 
classes in year t + N. [Data Source: European Patent Office] 
Originality+N The Herfindahl Index of the cited patents used to capture dispersion across technology 
classes in year t + N. [Data Source: European Patent Office] 
EPL_C An indicator variable that equals 1 (0) after (before) EPL index increases in a country-
year, and equals −1 (0) after (before) EPL index decreases in a country-year. We only 
consider changes in EPL index whose absolute value is greater than 0.2 (the mean value). 
[Data Source: Allard (2005)] 
EPL_A EPL index in Allard (2005). [Data Source: Allard (2005)] 
LnAssets The natural logarithm of total assets. [Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
ROA Returns on Assets. Net income divided by total assets. [Data Source: COMPUSTAT 
Global] 
MB Market-to-book ratio. Market value of common equity divided by book value of common 
equity. [Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
Tangibility The ratio of tangible assets over total assets. Net property, plant and equipment divided 
by total assets. [Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets [Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
R&D R&D expenses divided by total assets. [Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index scaled by sales based on the first two digits of SIC code. 
[Data Source: COMPUSTAT Global] 
LnGDP_Capita The natural logarithm of GDP per capita measured by GDP in U.S. dollars divided by total 
population. [Data Source: World Bank] 
LnPatentStock5 The natural logarithm of cumulative patents in a country over the past 5 years. [Data 
Source: European Patent Office] 
Ed_Share Public spending on secondary and tertiary education scaled by GDP. [Data Source: World 
Bank] 
IP Intellectual property protection index. [Data Source: IMD World Competitiveness 
Report] 
Trade International trade measured by the level of imports minus the level of exports in a 
country. [Data Source: IMF] 
Right An indicator for the political ideology of the ruling party, which equals one if it is right-
leaning and zero otherwise. [Data Source: World Bank] 
Disp_Index Gallagher Index. The disproportionality of the electoral system in a country. [Data 
Source: Gallagher and Mitchell (2008)] 
GDP_Growth Annual growth rate in GDP. [Data Source: World Bank] 
Unemployment The ratio of unemployment divided by labor force. [Data Source: OECD] 
Corruption Corruption Perceptions Index. Higher values indicate less corruption. [Data Source: 
Transparency International] 
Recession An indicator of recessions, which equals one if there are two consecutive quarters with 
negative GDP growth in a country and zero otherwise. [Data Source: OECD] 
Appendix C. Replication of baseline results in Acharya et al. (2013).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  




in Acharya et al. 
(2013)— Country 
Level 
      
DSL 1.9790*** 1.4078*** 
    
 
(7.82) (5.11) 
    
EPL_A 
  
0.1368*** 0.1400** −0.0932** −0.0822    
(2.73) (2.46) (−2.02) (−1.29) 
Constant 5.5453*** 6.8731*** 6.1303*** 7.2199*** 6.1983*** 7.2384***  
(39.04) (41.41) (47.61) (46.26) (37.28) (28.38) 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 100 100 100 100 357 357 
Adj. R-squared 0.987 0.985 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.973  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
LnPatt+N   LnCitet+N    
N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 N = 0 N = 1 N = 2 
Panel B: 
Replication of 
      
Baseline Results 
in Acharya et al. 
(2013)—Firm 
Level 
EPL_C −0.1181*** −0.0809*** −0.0728*** −0.0804*** −0.0783*** −0.0765***  
(−3.60) (−3.09) (−2.81) (−2.98) (−2.91) (−2.88) 
DSL 0.2565 0.1458 0.0515 0.1264 0.1828 0.1218  
(1.26) (0.82) (0.29) (0.72) (1.07) (0.70) 
LnAssets 0.0347*** 0.0347*** 0.0261*** 0.0320*** 0.0249*** 0.0173***  
(9.90) (9.73) (7.26) (9.23) (7.36) (5.00) 
ROA −0.0068 0.0041 0.0106 −0.0014 0.0089 0.0132  
(−0.89) (0.51) (1.26) (−0.16) (1.02) (1.52) 
MB 0.0013*** 0.0019*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0013***  
(4.07) (5.43) (4.31) (3.71) (4.13) (3.58) 
Tangibility −0.0130 −0.0064 −0.0147 −0.0117 −0.0116 −0.0159  
(−1.00) (−0.47) (−1.07) (−0.92) (−0.87) (−1.17) 
Leverage −0.0412*** −0.0585*** −0.0521*** −0.0372*** −0.0419*** −0.0420***  
(−3.92) (−5.49) (−5.06) (−3.52) (−4.14) (−4.19) 
R&D 0.1706*** 0.1785*** 0.0633* 0.1965*** 0.1778*** 0.0303  
(4.28) (4.71) (1.70) (4.36) (4.28) (0.72) 
HHI 0.0235 0.0112 −0.0015 0.0123 0.0134 0.0109  
(1.15) (0.55) (−0.07) (0.65) (0.71) (0.55) 
LnGDP_Capita 0.0252 −0.0185 −0.0391 −0.0269 −0.0217 −0.0291  
(0.57) (−0.52) (−1.12) (−0.76) (−0.62) (−0.87) 
LnPatentStock5 0.0047 −0.0010 −0.0012 0.0013 0.0010 −0.0021  
(1.09) (−0.34) (−0.44) (0.43) (0.36) (−0.78) 
Ed_Share −0.0067 −0.1572 −0.3598** −0.1069 −0.0575 −0.2735  
(−0.03) (−0.93) (−2.13) (−0.62) (−0.33) (−1.58) 
IP −0.0055 0.0295 0.0111 0.0037 0.0177 0.0198  
(−0.18) (1.02) (0.36) (0.14) (0.64) (0.64) 
Trade −0.0392 −0.0387 −0.0633 −0.0183 −0.0462 −0.0825**  
(−0.90) (−0.91) (−1.50) (−0.45) (−1.16) (−1.99) 
Right −0.0199*** −0.0163*** −0.0195*** −0.0142*** −0.0142*** −0.0167***  
(−4.17) (−3.85) (−4.48) (−3.31) (−3.28) (−3.79) 
Disp_Index 0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0017* 0.0004 −0.0001  
(0.14) (0.19) (0.54) (1.74) (0.39) (−0.12) 
Constant 0.0347*** 0.0347*** 0.0261*** 0.0320*** 0.0249*** 0.0173***  
(9.90) (9.73) (7.26) (9.23) (7.36) (5.00) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 124,594 124,594 124,594 124,594 124,594 124,594 
Adj. R-squared 0.777 0.799 0.806 0.767 0.776 0.783 
In Panel A, we replicate the baseline results in Acharya et al. (2013). DSL is the dismissal law index in Deakin et al. (2007). In 
columns (1)–(4), the sample includes four countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. In 
columns (5) and (6), we extend the sample by adding another 17 OECD countries. Country and year fixed are included. In 
Panel B, we replicate the baseline results in Acharya et al. (2013) using firm-level data. All variable definitions are given 
in Appendix B. In Panel B, each regression includes firm and year fixed effects. Below the coefficient estimates in 
parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Appendix D. Additional country-level controls. 
 
LnPat    LnCite    















(−2.73) (−2.91) (−2.45) (−1.34) (−3.44) (−3.61) (−3.14) (−1.81) 
Recession 0.0033 −0.0014 0.0016 0.0034 −0.0000 −0.0030 0.0017 0.0025  
(1.19) (−0.34) (0.39) (0.94) (−0.01) (−0.88) (0.55) (0.95) 
GDP_Growth 
 
−0.0046* −0.0041* 0.0002 
 
−0.0029* −0.0022 0.0001   
(−1.86) (−1.76) (0.25) 
 












   
−0.0228
* 
   
−0.0006 
    
(−2.00) 
   
(−0.05) 
Constant −0.1124 0.0460 −0.2559 0.7300*
* 
−0.1121 −0.0103 −0.4741 0.4853 
 
(−0.29) (0.15) (−0.86) (2.10) (−0.36) (−0.04) (−1.68) (1.62) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,574 62,857 90,752 90,752 90,574 62,857 
Adj. R-squared 0.687 0.687 0.687 0.764 0.772 0.772 0.773 0.833 
This table presents regression results after controlling additional country characteristics All variable definitions are given 
in Appendix B. Each regression includes firm and year fixed effects. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-
values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Appendix E. Alternative Innovation Variables  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
LnCitePatt+N  Generalityt+N  Originalityt+N   
N = 0 N = 2 N = 0 N = 2 N = 0 N = 2 
EPL_C −0.0491*** −0.0466** −0.0116*** −0.0105** −0.0191*** −0.0175***  
(−2.89) (−2.68) (−3.05) (−2.49) (−3.09) (−3.37) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant −0.2195 0.0058 −0.1899 −0.1567 −0.1971 −0.1750  
(−0.67) (0.02) (−1.47) (−1.43) (−1.08) (−1.16) 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 90,752 
Adj. R-squared 0.585 0.590 0.668 0.669 0.674 0.676 
This table presents the results for alternative innovation variables. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is 
LnCitePatt+N, which is the natural logarithm of citations received on the firm's patents applied, scaled by the number of 
patents applied for in year t + N (N = 0 or 2). In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is Generalityt+N, the Herfindahl 
Index of the citing patents used to capture dispersion across technology classes in year t + N. In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is Originalityt+N, the Herfindahl Index of the cited patents used to capture dispersion across technology 
classes in year t + N. All other variable definitions are given in Appendix B. Each regression includes firm and year fixed 
effects. Below the coefficient estimates in parentheses are t-values adjusted for heteroscedasticity and country-level 
clustering. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1% 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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